Genie: A Secure, Transparent Sharing and Services Platform for Genetic
  and Health Data by Zhang, Shifa et al.
Genie: A Secure, Transparent Sharing and Services Platform for
Genetic and Health Data
Shifa Zhang†, Anne Kim∗, Dianbo Liu∗, Sandeep C. Nuckchady†, Lauren Huang†, Aditya Masurkar†, Jingwei Zhang†, Lawrence Tseng†,
Pratheek Karnati‡, Laura Martinez§, Thomas Hardjono∗, Manolis Kellis∗, Zhizhuo Zhang∗
∗ Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Cambridge, Massachusetts 02142–1308
Email: {anneykim, dianbo,hardjono , manoli,zhizhuo}@mit.edu
† Secure AI Labs, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02142–1308
Email: {shifa, sandeep, lauren, aditya, jingwei, larry}@secureailabs.io
‡ IBM, 4205 S Miami Blvd, Durham, NC, 27703-9141
Email: karnatip@us.ibm.com
§ Intel Software Guard Extensions, Intel 2200 Mission College Blvd, Santa Clara, CA 95054
Email: laura.martinez@intel.com
Abstract—Artificial Intelligence (AI) incorporating genetic and
medical information have been applied in disease risk prediction,
unveiling disease mechanism, and advancing therapeutics. How-
ever, AI training relies on highly sensitive and private data which
significantly limit their applications and robustness evaluation.
Moreover, the data access management after sharing across
organization heavily relies on legal restriction, and there is no
guarantee in preventing data leaking after sharing.
Here, we present Genie, a secure AI platform which allows AI
models to be trained on medical data securely. The platform
combines the security of Intel Software Guarded eXtensions
(SGX), transparency of blockchain technology, and verifiability
of open algorithms and source codes. Genie shares insights of
genetic and medical data without exposing anyone’s raw data.
All data is instantly encrypted upon upload and contributed to
the models that the user chooses. The usage of the model and the
value generated from the genetic and health data will be tracked
via a blockchain, giving the data transparent and immutable
ownership.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background
Genomics-based personalized medicine began more than
ten years ago [6]. Genetic big data has shown promise in
conducting breast cancer studies, building the cancer genome
atlas (TCGA), and improving screening and diagnosis [37].
Many recent studies have prospective results with advanced
machine learning and artificial intelligence (AI) technologies
on genotypic and phenotypic big data [23], [9], [38], [15], [25],
[17]. Using large amounts of federated genetic and medical
data to train AI models and using these models to predict
diseases, drug responses, and personality traits will allow for
great advancements benefiting human health.
At the same time, the amount of data is growing very fast.
Th DNA sequencing has become cheaper, better, and faster in
recent years [21], [33]. The Electronic Health Record (EHR)
systems are more wildly adopted and generating huge amount
of data. However, regulations of both the Health Insurance
Portability Accountability Act (HIPAA) in U.S. and General
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) [12] in EU require a strict
protection on the private information in the data. Most of the
medical data are no accessible to many promising health care
AI algorithms because of privacy protection regulations. There
is a great need for a secure AI platform for AI models to
process on sensitive medical data.
B. Challenges
The central problem we tackle is how to protect private
information and preserve data ownership while sharing infor-
mation derived from the data in an open, transparent online
environment. Data are easily copied when shared. Once the
data are copied, ownerships of the data are eroded. Further-
more, there is no way to track data accesses and modifications
for those copied data.
Work by Hardjono, Shrier, and Pentland [35] on the open
algorithms (OPAL) paradigm points to the need for the sharing
of data and insights in a privacy-preserving manner. Addition-
ally, personal data is now recognized as a new asset class [40],
which introduces the need for individuals to have the ability to
consent to their data being used in computations [12]. There
is a clear need for a system that can respect a person’s rights
to their genetic and health data in order for that data to be
accessible to others.
A centralized database could have security facilities to
provide a secure environment for data users to access the data
without compromising privacy, but these databases are isolated
systems largely incompatible with each other, vulnerable to
attacks from insiders, and challenging to track once data has
been copied to external locations. Therefore, a centralized
solution is insufficient.
In this paper, we introduce the Genie (an acronym for
Genetic data Exploration by blockchaiN Interconnected En-
cryption) platform which is an open, distributed, transparent,
and secure marketplace to provide high quality genetic and
phenotypic big data, AI models, and a secure computation
platform, accelerating AI advancing in health care.
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II. EXISTING STUDIES
A. Homomorphic Encryption
Kim and Lauter introduced private genome analysis through
homomorphic encryption [20]. Homomorphic encryption al-
lows for computation on encrypted data without needing
decryption. The result of the computation is encrypted and
can only be decrypted with the same key used to encrypt
the input data. It is possible to do statistics or AI model
training on homomorphically encrypted user data without
decryption. Only computational results are decrypted. This
approach protects private information contained in the raw
genetic and phenotypic data.
Homomorphic computation was first raised in 1978 [29],
but there was little progress until Gentry published his thesis
about a fully homomorphic encryption scheme [14]. In 2012,
Fan and Vercauteren published an improved homomorphic
encryption scheme (FV) based on Gentry’s scheme [13],
bringing it a step closer to real applications. Some open source
homomorphic encryption libraries have been developed based
on the FV scheme, such as Microsoft SEAL [8].
Even though the performance of homomorphic encryption
and computation has improved significantly in recent years,
it is still too expensive to do useful computation for the
purposes of genotypic and phenotypic big data analysis, based
on performance data from Bajard, et al. [2].
There are some other issues with the homomorphic en-
cryption for private data sharing. First, If allowing arbitrary
computations (normally required by AI training) on the en-
crypted data, it can infer raw data from the computation
results. Second, it is difficult to use data from multiple data
owners because homomorphic computation requires that all
input data are encrypted with the same encryption key.
B. Hybrid Homomorphic Encryption and Intel SGX [19]
The Secure gwAs in Federated Environment Through a
hYbrid solution with Intel SGX and Homomorphic Encryption
(SAFETY) framework with hybrid homomorphic encryption
and Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) was proposed
for genome-wide association study (GWAS) research in 2017
by Sadat, et al. [32]. The framework uses homomorphic
encryption to encrypt a data owner’s data and do basic
statistics with homomorphic computation on the encrypted
data. Afterwards, the statistics results are sent into SGX private
regions of memory, called enclaves, to be decrypted for further
computation. Researchers using the enclave can query the
results in the enclave. This hybrid framework can get higher
performance than pure homomorphic computation because
time-consuming multiplying operations can be done in the
enclave with the unencrypted data. Because computations on
the raw data occur only inside the enclave, this approach still
protects the privacy of data owners.
However, if the data user can program the software in the
enclave, it is still possible to reverse the computation on the
homomorphically encrypted data and extract the raw data. If
the user cannot program the software in the enclave, it limits
the extent of analysis that can be done on the data.
In the SAFETY framework, data usage is not tracked.
Therefore, data owners cannot be compensated for data usage.
C. Blockchain for Health Care
Kuo, Kim, and Machado introduced blockchain distributed
ledger technologies for biomedical and healthcare applications
[22]. The blockchain has the advantages of being distributed,
robust, tamper-resistant and transparent compared with tradi-
tional relational databases. Using the blockchain in biomedical
and healthcare fields bring the benefits of improved medical
record management, enhanced insurance claim processes, ac-
celerated clinical/biomedical research, and advanced biomed-
ical/healthcare ledgers. Disadvantages of the blockchain in
these fields include too much transparency when handling
confidential information, restrictions on speed and scalability,
and possible >50% malicious attacks [22].
Linn and Koo introduced blockchain for health data [24].
The authors pointed out that blockchain technology ad-
dresses interoperability challenges in health data management.
Blockchain is based on open standards and is widely accepted.
III. PRIMARY PRINCIPLES
This section introduces the primary principles of the Genie
platform: privacy-protected and data ownership-preserved data
sharing with open algorithm/open source code, Intel Software
Guarded eXtensions (SGX), and the blockchain technologies.
A. Open Algorithm and Source Code
The two techniques that open algorithms (OPAL) [35] use
to protect privacy in shared data are as follows:
1) Algorithms are sent to secure and trusted data storages
to be evaluated directly on the data instead of sending
the private data somewhere else to be processed. The
algorithms are publicly inspected and share only results
that will never compromise the raw data.
2) The algorithms and each evaluation of the algorithms are
logged in an immutable database, such as a blockchain.
In the Genie platform, open source code is an important as-
pect of the OPAL paradigm. The source code of the distributed
application (Dapp), SGX enclave, and AI model evaluation
algorithms are all openly shared online. The cryptographic
hashes of these open source codes are registered on the
blockchain and can be used by anyone to verify that they have
a copy of the original source code.
Open source software has become very popular, 20 years
since the book Open sources: Voices from the open source
revolution was published [11]. The movement has been driven
by not only lower development costs but also better security.
Open source software has more eyes looking at it, making it
less likely to has security flaws. Users can be confident that
open source software will not maliciously access or distribute
personal information.
Genie provides a trusted ecosystem of data handling soft-
ware. All of the platform’s software, including the SGX en-
clave software, user-side software, and distributed application
(Dapp), that processes raw private data and generates outputs
to any human users must be open source. Professional security
auditors and the platform users can inspect everything the
system does and ensure that it does nothing harmful to their
data. The auditors can also re-compile the code to generate
the initial state of the software, which can be used to verify
the software’s installation package.
Open source software also provides several other advan-
tages. The accessibility of open source code allows a large
number of people to contribute to ongoing improvements of
the software, including the identification of vulnerabilities.
One disadvantage, however, is that vulnerabilities in the soft-
ware are also open to the public, which could provide an
attacker the knowledge to mount attacks on deployments of
the software that have not yet been patched.
To minimize the risk of vulnerabilities, we carry out security
inspection, testing, and third party auditing for each new
release. The platform’s users can also inspect the software by
themselves because they have the entirety of the source code.
B. The SGX Trusted Execution Environment
Intel CPU Software Guard eXtensions (SGX) can create
secure enclaves. An enclave is a hardware-isolated section of
CPU memory which cannot be accessed from outside of the
enclave, even with system privileges [10]. An SGX enclave
can be used to run secure software and store sensitive data
such as passwords, private keys, and personal data.
While an SGX enclave is isolated from the outside world,
it is not safe if the software running inside it is malicious.
The process of attestation ensures that code running inside an
enclave is tamper-free [26], [18], [5]. Basically, the attestation
process asks the platform on which the enclave is running
to provide proof of the software’s initial state in the enclave.
Then, the proof is signed by the secret private key of the
CPU on the platform. The Intel Attestation Service (IAS) can
verify the signature and approve that the software running in
the enclave has specific initial state which is the same as the
executable image of the enclave.
But there are still two issues even when the enclave has
been attested. First, how to know if the software running in
the enclave is safe? This question can be answered by the
audit reports on the open source codes. And the attestation
can ensure the running enclave is identical to the software
being audited.
Second, how can the attester know that the public key
belongs to secure hardware and not a malicious device? The
answer is that the public key must be provided or certified by
a trusted organization. For SGX, a secret private key and a
public key pair is generated during the manufacturing of the
CPU. The secret key is stored and kept secret inside the CPU.
The public key is stored by Intel. Intel doesn’t publish the
CPU public keys. Instead, Intel provides an attestation service
to verify the signature of SGX CPU.
Therefore, the trust of the enclave relies on both open source
code and Intel. Some people criticize SGX because it requires
trust in Intel [34]. However, trusted systems must always rely
on a root of trust. Users have to trust the manufacturing of the
secure CPU and trust that there are no mistakes when handling
the keys. Users have to trust the Public-key Infrastructure
(PKI) [1] providing the attestation report certificates. Even if
Intel directly published CPU public keys, users would still
need to trust the certificates for the public keys signed by
Intel.
C. Blockchain
Blockchain is a distributed public ledger based on crypto-
graphic technologies first introduced by Nakamoto in 2008
[30].
Blockchain is a peer-to-peer network without any central-
ized administration. A new blockchain user or node can be
created at any time. Each user account includes a key pair:
one private key and one public key. The public key is used
as the account ID and the private key is kept secret to prove
account ownership and to generate signatures.
Blockchain generates a new block to store the new transac-
tions in a fixed period of time. A proof-of-work mechanism
is used to select an account (miner) to create the new block.
The miner adds the new transactions, a hash of the previous
block, and its signature into the new block and adds it to the
blockchain. Data written into the blockchain is incorruptible,
because any modification on a block needs the block’s miner’s
private key to generate a new signature. Any changes would
also need all the following blocks’ miners’ private keys in
order to update the hashes of the modified blocks in their
adjacent blocks. Therefore, even if a particular miner’s private
key is compromised sometime after the block was mined, it
is still not possible to modify the block mined by the miner.
The transactions on public blockchains are transparent to
anyone in the world. We can take advantage of this trans-
parency to track usage of a data donor’s data, even if it is
incorporated into an AI model trained with many data donors’
data. Both the acts of donating data to a model and querying
a model are recorded as transactions.
A smart contract on a blockchain is a piece of executable
code which can be used to define business logic and automate
transactions. We developed two smart contracts for the plat-
form to provide data registration, payment escrow, and tokens.
The purposes of using blockchain for the platform are:
1) Storing immutable data. This includes cryptographic
hashes of raw data and ownership information. The
hashes of the data can be used later to audit the data,
namely to prove that the off-chain data has not been
modified in an unauthorized manner. The validated ge-
netic and health data, enclave images, enclave source
codes, AI model data, and attestation reports are too
large to be put on the blockchain and must be stored
elsewhere. As such, only the hashes of these data are
put on the blockchain and are used later to prove the
data are tamper-free. Ownership information includes
the account IDs of the owners of the data, models, and
the enclave instances. Ownership information is used to
send revenue generated from the data services to the
correct accounts according to the business logic defined
in the smart contract.
2) Decentralizing authorizations. This allows users to create
anonymous accounts by themselves, helpful for protect-
ing the privacy of users.
3) Transparency of transactions. It is important for AI
model data owned by many data donors who contribute
their data to the model training and the model trainer.
Provenance is important for data donors who want to
know exactly how their data is being used and for model
trainers who want to verify the validity of the data.
4) Business automation and monetary/financial incentives.
Blockchain smart contracts support payment escrow and
auto redistribution of revenues. This not only reduces
transaction costs and delays but also enforces the incen-
tive structure for data donors and all other contributors.
Even though blockchain has many advantages such as decen-
tralized authorization, transparency, and business automation,
it also has limitations we need to overcome.
Firstly, the storage space on the blockchain is very limited
and costly. It is not feasible to put complete genetic and
health data, AI models, or even registration information on
the blockchain.
The data on the blockchain is publicly open. No private
information should be put onto the blockchain.
On Genie platform, we use off-chain storages for either
large or private data. The private data are stored in the data
owner’s storage behind a firewall or in SGX secure envi-
ronments. Public data are stored on multiple public storages
such as GeneTank data storage services, IPFS (InterPlanetary
File System), Github, and/or Dropbox at the same time. The
integrity of these off-chain data is ensured by the data’s
cryptographic hashes registered on the blockchain.
Secondly, blockchain mining performance is low. Each new
block can only be generated in a fixed period (a few minutes)
and each block can only store a limited number of transactions,
due to block size and/or computational power restrictions.
When there are thousands of transactions happening in a
short period of time, the mining delay can be long. Many
transactions have to increase their transaction fees to let them
be mined earlier. The only way to improve the number of
transactions per second (TPS), reduce latency, and reduce
transaction fees is to do as much as possible off-chain [27].
We carefully designed the system to minimize necessary
blockchain transactions to mitigate the performance and high
transaction fee issues of the blockchain.
Thirdly, it is not possible to verify the authenticity of
user-contributed data with blockchain alone, and encrypted
genotype/phenotype information cannot be verified without
decrypting it. The Genie platform uses real world, trustable
public key infrastructure (PKI) [3] and trusted SGX enclaves
to ensure the data registered on the blockchain are trustworthy.
For example, the originality of the genetic and health data
registered by the data owner can be verified with a digital
signature provided by a data validation SGX enclave. The
data validation enclave’s integrity can in turn be verified with
certificates included in its attestation report, signed by Intel
IAS under PKI.
D. Data ownership preservation and privacy protection
Inspired by the ChainAnchor architecture for anonymously
registering ownership of the IoT devices on the blockchain
[16], we register the attested enclave to the blockchain to
ensure unchangeable ownership.
Figure 1 depicts the ownership-preserving and privacy-
protecting framework. We open source the source codes of the
Fig. 1. The Security Framework
software that handles sensitive data, so security experts and/or
data owners can audit the software to ensure its safety. Intel
SGX gives us a secure execution environment (or enclave)
in which we can run the audited code. The enclave’s CPU
hardware prevents any access from outside of the enclave
even with system privileges, and the software that runs in the
enclave can be attested by the CPU-signed measurement of
the software loaded in the memory.
The enclave software itself is another important factor for
the safety of the enclave. We open source the source codes of
the enclave; they must pass security audits before users can
trust them.
With source code auditing and enclave attestation, the
enclave software becomes a trustable entity which can be used
to enforce data safety rules and some business logic when
working with the blockchain. These business logic and security
rules include:
1) Never send out any data during model training.
2) Delete user data after use.
3) Only accept data validated by a validation enclave.
4) Record every use and payment transaction of AI model
prediction services on the blockchain.
Based on the first rule, no human can see the raw data in
the enclave. The shared data can only be used by the enclave
software to train an AI or statistical model. The query results
are generated from the model, not from individual user data.
In this way, the insights of genetic and health data are shared
without exposing anyone’s raw data.
IV. THE ARCHITECTURE OF THE GENIE PLATFORM
The Genie platform currently is implemented with Ethereum
as the blockchain backbone to integrate all the data and
services into an anonymous, secure, privacy protected, and
open system.
The system is trustless. All the trainers, runners, and users
are anonymous participants, none of whom are assumed to be
trustful for security. No real-world identification information
is required for any of the participants. The openness of the
platform allows people to donate data, utilize data, provide
services, and use services with very low management costs.
On this trustless platform, the safety of the AI Model
and user genetic and prototypic data is well-protected with a
combination of open source, blockchain, and secure execution
environment technologies as described in the Principles sec-
tion. The security mechanism of the platform protects all user
data (including the AI model algorithms, model parameters,
and user genetic and phenotypic data) while these data are
being processed, transferred, and stored.
Fig. 2. The Architecture of the Genie Platform
As shown in Figure 2, the platform uses IBM Cloud to host
the Genie SGX enclaves powered by Intel processors. Genie
users can use the enclaves to train AI models and run the
models in a trustable way.
The picture shows the entities of the system as well:
• Data owner: Individuals or organizations who own the
genetic and health data.
• Model trainer: Pharmaceutical companies, biomedical
companies, or medical researchers who want to use
the data from the data owners to train their artificial
intelligence or statistical models.
• Enclave runner: People or organizations who have com-
putation resources which can be used to run the enclaves
for data validation or model prediction services.
• End user: Individuals, hospitals, or pharmaceutical com-
panies who want to use the model prediction services to
predict the risk of diseases, drug responses, and traits of
individuals with certain genotypes.
• Blockchain smart contract: The smart contract developed
by GeneTank to register the data, models, and enclaves
and automate the business logic.
• Intel IAS: The attestation service which is provided by
Intel for the enclaves running on Intel CPU platform.
• GeneTank Service Provider: A proxy for the enclaves
which need to be attested. It forwards the attestation
request to Intel IAS, and sends back the attestation reports
from Intel IAS.
• Enclave: There are three types of enclaves: data validation
enclave, model training enclave, and model query service
enclave.
1) The data validation enclave validates data from data
owners and provide a signature for the data if the
data are valid.
2) The model training enclave collects data from data
owners and performs model training securely. There
is no single output which can be sent out of the
enclave.
3) The query service enclave uses genetic and/or phe-
notypic data from the end user as input, runs the
model to generates prediction results, and sends the
results to the end user.
V. DATA FLOW
To describe how the platform works, we introduce four main
data flows of the system in following sections:
A) New Enclave registration, auditing and attestation flow
B) Data preprocessing, validation and registration
C) Model registration and data recruiting
D) AI model query flow.
A. Enclave registration, auditing, and attestation flow
Enclaves can be developed by anyone who wants to con-
tribute to the platform. The basic requirement for the enclaves
is that they must be registered on the blockchain and accepted
by the participants of the platform. GeneTank currently devel-
ops the enclaves for the initial phase of the platform.
Fig. 3. The Enclave Attestation and Registration Flow
As shown in Figure 3, the enclave developer uploads the
source codes, an executable binary image, and description
information of the enclave to one or more publicly accessi-
ble repositories (e.g. Github, or GeneTank repository), then
registers a hash of the source code and a measurement of the
executable image of the enclave to the blockchain.
Fig. 4. The Enclave Attestation Flow
The registrations of any information on the blockchain are
done with a Distributed Application (Dapp) developed by
GeneTank.
The auditors (can be professionals or data owners) audit
the source codes of the enclave, and compile the source codes
into an executable image, and calculate the measurement of
the generated image. The measurement must be the same
with the one registered by the enclave developer. The auditor
uploads an audit report to the public / off-chain repositories
and registers a hash of the audit report on the blockchain.
The enclave runner verifies the enclave by reviewing the
audit reports and/or source codes on the repository and checks
against the registration records on the blockchain. If the
enclave meets all the security requirements, the enclave runner
downloads and installs the enclave.
After installation, the enclave runner starts attestation. The
enclave generates a quote for itself. The quote includes the
measurement of the enclave memory image before initial-
ization, the public key of a self-generated key pair for its
identification, some other information, and the signature by the
CPUs secret key. The enclave sends the quote to the GeneTank
Service Provider server. The server forwards the quote to the
Intel IAS through a secure rest API.
The IAS verifies the quote with the EPID of the CPU and
generates an attestation report. The report is sent back to the
GeneTank Service Provider, then forwarded to the enclave and
the enclave runner.
The enclave runner uploads the enclave information includ-
ing an attestation report, the p2p address of the enclave, and
some other information to the repository and registers the hash
of the enclave information to the blockchain.
Some details of the enclave attestation flow of the platform
are shown in Figure 4.
B. Data owner registration
When data owners obtain data from DNA sequencing
companies or upload phenotypic information by answering
questionnaires or providing medical records, they encrypt and
upload the data to a data validation enclave for preprocessing
and validation.
The validation enclave decrypts data in the secure environ-
ment and processes it with an artificial intelligent algorithm
to identify fabricated data. Fake data will fail to pass the data
validation.
The enclave sends back the processed data and an enclave
signed report about the data through an encrypted communi-
cation channel. Then the data owner stores the data and the
validation report locally and safely and registers the hash of
the report to the blockchain.
The registered hash of the report acts as an ownership record
of the data and will be used by the model trainer to verify the
report. Only the data registered on the smart contract can be
used for model training.
The data registration can be withdrawn at any time by the
data owner.
This procedure is described in Figure 5.
Fig. 5. The Data Validation and Data Owner Registration Flow
Each time the data owners update their data, the data must
be sent to a data validation and preprocessing enclave. The
data owners will get a data validation report and pre-processed
data.
C. Model registration and data recruiting
A model trainer recruits data from the Genie platform to
train a new model. The overall model registration and data
recruiting is depicted in Figure 6.
Fig. 6. The Model Trainer Registration and Data Searching
The trainer has to go through the following steps:
• Install an enclave package registered on the blockchain
• Get the newly installed enclave instance attested
• Upload a white paper of the model to the off-chain reposi-
tory to describe what service the model will provide, what
data are required for the model training, what are the
instant payments for the data donors, how the revenues
of the model will be shared, etc.
• Register the model as recruiting model to the blockchain.
After a training model is registered, the data recruiting follows
these steps:
• The trainer sends data recruiting messages (p2p message
through the blockchain) to all the data owners
• Each Dapp (the same application as for registration)
processes the message and analyzes whether the local
user data meet the data requirements. If yes, the Dapp
informs the data owner to check the conditions and
rewards of the model. If the data owner confirms to
share the data, the Dapp sends a search result and the
validation report of user data to the model trainer. The
data owners can also configure their interests’ types of
models (whitelist) or the types of the models they dont
like (blacklist).
• The model trainer checks the search result and the data
report. If it is acceptable, the trainer asks the data owner
to send the data to the training enclave
• The data owner reviews the auditing reports of the
enclave; (optional) redoes the auditing by themselves to
further ensure safety of the enclave; verifies the enclave
with the enclave public key in attestation report registered
on the blockchain and some other information in the off-
chain repository; (optional) asks the enclave to redo the
attestation if the attestation report is not up to date; if the
enclave is safe, sends the data to the enclave provided by
the trainer and gets a receipt from the enclave through an
encrypted secure channel
• The data owner registers himself as a data donor of
the model with the receipt (including quality level, a
signature of the enclave)
• The smart contract verifies the receipt from the enclave
before it accepts the donor registration.
The data owners may withdraw their data anytime during
model training but if the data have been used, the effects of
the data in the model may not be removed.
D. Model training and model runner enclave registration
Model training is done within the enclave. Nobody can see
the intermediate and final results of the training. The trainer
may use their own data to query the model to evaluate the
training result. These evaluation activities must be recorded
on the blockchain (enforced by the SGX enclave) as other
ordinary queries which must be paid on the blockchain.
Data from the owners are deleted soon after the model is
trained to avoid long-term vulnerabilities regarding data safety.
This is enforced by the audited codes of the enclave. The
donor’s data is not possible to be used for training other models
unless the data owner decides to participate in these models.
Fig. 7. The Model Query Flow
The trainer changes the status of the model from training
model to trained model on the blockchain so that it becomes
ready for model running. The trained model is stored inside the
enclave. The model trainer registration keeps all the ownership
information on the blockchain.
The model running includes the steps of installing model
runner enclave, attesting the enclave, and registering the en-
clave.
The data flow of the runner enclave installation, attestation,
and registration is largely the same as the validation and
training enclaves. The differences are that the model codes
must be open source and have passed auditing to prevent
leaking model data when generating query result outputs.
E. Model querying
When anyone (end user) wants to use an AI model service
to get predictions based on their genetic and health data, they
can follow the data flow as shown in Figure 7 through the
Dapp. If an end users data has not been registered yet, they
need to validate and register the data to link ownership of that
data. The genetic data and an optional part of health data are
encrypted and uploaded to the enclave.
The enclave accesses the blockchain to verify a successful
payment of the access code. Once the payment is valid, the
enclave runs the AI model and returns prediction results.
Otherwise, it refuses the request.
After the service is provided successfully, the payment from
the end user is transferred to all of the accounts of the model’s
stakeholders (which include data donors, model trainers, and
model runners) or temporarily saved in the smart contract of
the blockchain until the stakeholders claim it.
VI. DETAILS OF DESIGN
We explained how the Genie platform works in previous
sections. Some details of the implementation of the plat-
form are described below about the P2P communication,
blockchain, smart contract, data management, and enclave
designs.
A. P2P communication
The platform is built on a distributed peer-to-peer (P2P)
blockchain network which has the advantages of being anony-
mous and privacy-protected. The native blockchain can only
send broadcasting messages. We extended the P2P protocol
to support point to point messages as well. The Dapp can
create P2P accounts to receive/send instant messages from/to
other platform users. The P2P account is different from the
blockchain account which can be found publicly on the
blockchain. This can further protect user privacy and avoid
unwanted harassment.
The enclaves are also on the P2P communication network.
The data owners/donors and the model users can communicate
with the enclaves over the P2P network.
Over the P2P network, platform users can:
Search for peers: Search the endpoint (IP addresses and port
numbers) of any given P2P account ID;
Send unicast messages: Send messages to a specific P2P
account;
Send broadcast messages: Send messages to all the Dapps.
The broadcast message sender must be registered on the
blockchain as a model trainer. The Dapp can filter the mes-
sages according to the preference setting of its user;
Chat in a chat room: A chat room is a channel for a specific
topic. The Dapp can join these channels based on the user’s
interests.
B. Blockchain and Smart Contract
The underlying design eliminates the need for a trustable
third party through the use of Ethereum smart contracts [7]
and SGX. Smart contracts are symbiotically linked to the
blockchain. Writing to a blockchain requires someone to send
a transaction which needs to be confirmed by other nodes. The
mechanism to achieve this uses either proof of work or proof
of stake or a hybrid which is the case in the latest version
of Ethereum. Ethereum provides a Turing complete Ethereum
virtual machine where smart contracts run. Smart contracts are
codes that are executed depending on conditions set within
the code. Ether is used to incentivize people to participate and
can also be used as a cryptocurrency to facilitate payments
in different applications. Each computation in Ethereum has a
gas fee.
The Genie platform uses smart contracts to store access
control policies [39], [28] like who are registered and whether
anybody has tampered with the enclaves, donor’s data, and
model training parameters. The GeneTank smart contract logs
information about data donors, registration information by
the creators, trainers and runners, model details trained by
the trainer, and any relevant information about access codes
generated by the runner for the users. Access codes are
used to identify specific user data sent for prediction of a
disease. Payments made towards a prediction result of a user’s
data are distributed to the different parties involved in this
process: trainers, runners, and donors. Using tokens as a form
of payments is easier than relying on a central authority to
distribute fiat currencies.
C. Data management
Private personal data is usually stored locally on a users
device where can protect privacy and ownership very well.
For users on mobile devices, they can use the secure data
storage service with an SGX enclave on the cloud.
There is also publicly available data such as the source
codes and binary codes of enclaves, the white papers for
data recruiting, the attestation reports of the enclaves, and the
information of the resources available on the platform. These
public data have at least one copy which is stored on the
GeneTank server. The platform supports other public storages
such as Github, IPFS, etc. to improve accessibility.
D. The enclave software and AI model container
The enclave software design is one of the cornerstones of the
platform. Security is the first priority but the performance and
scalability for biomedical big data processing is also critical
for the success of the platform.
We create a virtual machine (VM) as a container for the AI
model software which run the AI algorithms. The container
isolates the AI model from other parts of the enclave. The AI
model running in the container can only access data provided
through an input channel. The output from the container is
tightly controlled by the enclave software. This design allows
the container to run secret AI model training algorithms
without fears of compromising the security of the data. It can
protect trainer’s proprietary AI algorithms and the privacy of
data owners at the same time.
The virtual machine currently supports AI algorithms writ-
ten in the R programming language. R is wildly adopted for
both biomedical and deep learning applications. It matches
the requirements of both bioinformatics data processing and
machine learning very well.
The VM runs the R bytecode compiled with an R compiler
[36]. The bytecode programs can be transferred into the
enclave and run on the VM so that the enclave can do many
different models without changing the code of the enclave. It
makes the enclave software more stable and much less auditing
work is required.
Any R programs which use the strictly controlled output
channel must be open source. R programs with malicious code
sending out secret information from the VM can’t pass the
security audit.
To prevent closed-source AI training model algorithms from
sending out private data with side-channel attacks [4], [31],
the enclave software randomizes the data input, out-of-enclave
memory access, disk operation, inter-enclave communication
by inserting dummy operations and rescheduling them to
prevent reading out data by monitoring the AI models external
behaviors.
Each enclave has a very limited memory size, much less
than the requirements of biomedical big data processing. We
developed a virtual memory system using the memory outside
of the enclave to expand the memory size in the enclave. All
the data written to the external memory or disk are encrypted.
The encryption key for external memory is generated each
time the enclave starts up. The files permanently stored on the
disk are encrypted with an SGX Sealing key [18].
Fig. 8. The Enclave Design with Virtual Machine
We also support scale-out parallel processing which can
divide the tasks into smaller ones and allocate to multiple
enclaves to process. The enclaves can work in a coordinated
manner to improve the performance of training. The enclaves
can be deployed on one or multiple computers.
Private data in the enclave can be stored on permanent
storage such as hard drives securely with the SGX data
sealing feature. The sealed data are encrypted and can only
be decrypted by the enclave which saved them. The design of
the enclave with virtual machines is shown in Figure 8.
Some explanation about the numbered items in the figure:
1) The inputs include the data from data owners or the
query users or commands from the trainers. The depth
of the input buffer is randomly changed to prevent side-
channel attack from malicious AI Model training R
bytecode.
2) The R bytecode is driven by the data inputs include the
commands. The bytecode is a blackbox (close source)
for training and a whitebox (open source) for querying.
3) Only the querying bytecode which has been registered
on the blockchain can generate outputs. The output is
encrypted and can only be decrypted by the model query
end user.
4) The external disk is a database of R objects. Any read-
modify-write operations are managed within transactions
to protect data in the event that the system crash.
5) The database can be shared with other enclaves with the
same R bytecodes to support parallel training
VII. CONCLUSION
Genie is a AI-as-a-service marketplace platform, empower-
ing by public genetic and health data. Genie provide high-
est standard of secure and immutability with Intel SGX,
blockchain, and open source technologies to protect the pri-
vacy and preserve ownership of data.
The platform is decentralized and open to all individuals or
organization data owners. Pharmaceutical companies, biotech
companies, and biomedical researchers can use the platform
to recruit data easily through distributed data searches for
AI model training and create powerful models for disease
predictions, drug responses, and personal traits. Individuals
and hospitals can access the services provided by these AI
models.
The platform enforces the rights of data ownership including
possession, control, distribution, and disposal of the owner’s
genetic and health data. The platform also maintains the data
donors’ and model trainer’s ownership of the AI models.
The revenues generated by the AI models’ prediction services
are transferred automatically to all the owners of the models
and the people who run the models. It encourages all the
participants to continue contributing to the platform and forms
a positive incentive loop.
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